VII. Conference for Students and PhD Candidates

In the context of the DGPhil conference 2021 at the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU) the seventh conference for students and PhD candidates will take place on the 9th of September. This conference aims to provide students and PhD candidates with the opportunity to present their projects, current research, and philosophical ideas. Presentations may be given in English or German and should take 15 – 20 minutes and will be followed by discussion.

Besides this, the workshop will offer talks by experts on common hurdles and hindrances in the course of writing one’s dissertation. The informal atmosphere will allow not only for fruitful philosophical exchange, but also for open discussion of the personal and societal difficulties faced by PhD candidates.

Students and PhD candidates are invited to submit a proposal for a talk by 3rd of January 2020 via ConfTool. Submissions should include a (preliminary) title, an abstract of no more than 350 words (suitable for a 15- to 20-min presentation), and a list of three key-words. Submitted talks may be identical to talks submitted for the main conference. The submissions will be reviewed by students of the Bundesfachschaftentagung Philosophie e.V. (BuFaTa) as well as by the local organizers.

We also welcome students or PhD candidates who do not wish to give a talk to attend the conference. In that case please register via ConfTool by 5th of July 2021.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Dorothee Bleisch.

Organisation
Bundesfachschaftentagung Philosophie e.V. (BuFaTa), Alexander Belak, Dorothee Bleisch, Sebastian Schmidt, Konstantin Weber

Registration and Submission
ConfTool

Workshop: Qualitätssicherung der Promotion und Karrierewege in der Wissenschaft
7.1 Reasons Factualism and Internalist Intuitions
7.2 Delusions Are Responsive To Reason
7.3 Fairness versus Genauigkeit? Wertekonflikte im Umgang mit Entscheidungsalgorithmen
7.4 Conceptualizing Disease – Antithetical Aims
7.5 Die globale Infragestellung des liberalen Rechts: Zu einer Politisierung des Rechtsbegriffs anhand einer biopolitischen Konzeption des Demos
7.6 Sprechen ist wie ein Schlag auf den Kopf
7.7 On How Hermeneutical Injustice May Undermine Self-Respect
7.8 Epistemic normativity naturalized: towards an evolutionary expressivist account

Workshop: Qualitätssicherung der Promotion und Karrierewege in der Wissenschaft

Thursday, September 9th, 2021  |  16:30 – 18:00 p.m.  |  Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Dr. Fabian Lausen (Wissenschaftsrat Cologne)

Dr. Fabian Lausen vom (deutschen) Wissenschaftsrat wird uns einen Einblick in mögliche Karrierewege nach der Promotion geben und mit uns über Qualitätssicherungsaspekte in der Promotion sprechen.

7.1 Reasons Factualism and Internalist Intuitions

Thursday, September 9th, 2021  |  09:15 – 09:45 a.m.  |  Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Inken Titz (LMU Munich)

Reality favors certain ways of acting and believing. This position finds an expression in the view that normative reasons are facts. However, while the basic realist picture is broadly uncontested, reasons factualism is facing difficulties. A few theories tackle these difficulties by paying special attention to the role of seemings. I argue that they don’t achieve their goal of pairing reasons factualism with internalist intuitions. As a modest alternative I defend the idea that evidence for p provides reasons for q given p is (if true) a reason for q.

7.2 Delusions Are Responsive To Reason

Thursday, September 9th, 2021  |  09:45 – 10:15 a.m.  |  Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Marie van Loon (Zurich)

Delusions are often taken to be paradigmatic cases of belief for which subjects are not responsible. This idea motivates the thought that, in spite of beliefs not being under direct voluntary control, we should differentiate between beliefs for which we are responsible and beliefs for which we are not responsible. Prima facie, this idea seems more than fair. Yet, philosophers of psychiatry have urged that it is in fact important to be able to hold individuals with mental illnesses responsible for their behaviour. In this talk, I will show that a dominant theory of doxastic responsonsibility, Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness, is able to respond to the experts’ call.

7.3 Fairness versus Genauigkeit? Wertekonflikte im Umgang mit Entscheidungsalgorithmen

Thursday, September 9th, 2021 |  11:00 – 11:30 a.m.  |  Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Jannik Zeiser (Hannover)

Computer unterstützen uns Menschen zunehmend in Entscheidungen: vom Online-Shopping bis zu Gerichtsverhandlungen. Mitunter sind diese Systeme zwar vorhersagemächtig, benachteiligen einige Menschen aber in unfairer Weise. Sind wir dennoch epistemisch darin gerechtfertigt, Überzeugungen auf den Empfehlungen solcher Maschinen zu basieren? Ich stelle Argumente vor, die Gründe geben, dies anzuzweifeln.

7.4 Conceptualizing Disease – Antithetical Aims

Thursday, September 9th, 2021  |  11:30 – 12:00 a.m.  |  Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Jakob Eichler (HU Berlin)

There are two aims in our conceptual analysis of disease: a concept of disease should cover paradigmatic cases and it should allow for non-arbitrary decisions in rather controversial cases. Tragically these two aims are antithetical in nature – we can’t meet both. In most of my talk I will motivate this claim. In the little that is left, I discuss how we should proceed.

7.5 Die globale Infragestellung des liberalen Rechts: Zu einer Politisierung des Rechtsbegriffs anhand einer biopolitischen Konzeption des Demos

Thursday, September 9th, 2021  |  14:00 – 14:30 p.m.  |  Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Simon Faets (HfPh Munich)

Der Liberalismus begründet die Legitimität des Rechts im Rekurs auf die Volkssouveränität. Dabei wird das Volk ausgehend vom Nationalstaat verstanden. Die Repräsentation des Volkes durch das Recht erfordert dessen begriffliche Bestimmung durch eine territoriale Begrenzung. Damit produziert der Liberalismus jedoch neue Ausschlüsse aus dem Recht. Denn die wachsende Anzahl der Menschen, die infolge der Globalisierung ihren Rechtsstatus und ihre Staatsbürgerschaft verloren haben, wird durch diesen nationalstaatlich konzeptualisierten Repräsentationsbegriff verfehlt. Um das Volk global zu begreifen setzt die Perspektive der Biopolitik demgegenüber am politischen Widerstand derer an, die aus den nationalen Rechtsordnungen ausgeschlossen sind.

7.6 Sprechen ist wie ein Schlag auf den Kopf

Thursday, September 9th, 2021  |  14:30 – 15:00 p.m.  | Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Daniel Höft (PH Ludwigsburg)

Äußerungen dienen bestimmten Zwecken. Aber das ist – so die verbreitete Auffassung – nicht die Bedeutung oder der Gehalt der Äußerungen. Eine sprachliche Handlung zu verstehen, hieße demnach mehr als nur ihren Zweck zu kennen. Unterscheidet sich aber eine sprachliche Handlung zu verstehen tatsächlich in dieser Weise davon, eine nicht-sprachliche Handlung zu verstehen? Ist Sprechen nicht vielmehr wie ein Schlag auf den Kopf?

7.7 On How Hermeneutical Injustice May Undermine Self-Respect

Thursday, September 9th, 2021  |  15:15 – 15:45 p.m.  |  Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Agnes Striegan (LMU Munich)

A thus far untheorized harm of hermeneutical injustice is that it can undermine the self-respect of those affected by it. Hermeneutical injustice may cause one doubt in one’s moral rights; it may hinder one from acting upon one’s moral rights; and it may disturb one’s emotional reaction toward oneself. This can be seen in stories of gay youth struggling to accept themselves when provided with only homophobic conceptions of their sexuality.

7.8 Epistemic normativity naturalized: towards an evolutionary expressivist account

Thursday, September 9th, 2021  |  15:45 – 16:15 p.m.  |  Institute of Philosophy, Bismarckstrasse 1, Room A401

Basil Müller (Zurich)

How should we, as naturalists, make sense of the fact(s) that i) beliefs have a standard of correctness and ii) we take epistemic norms to be categorical? Here I outline an account that is both evolutionary and expressivist. It is evolutionary in its focus on the function of beliefs and in adopting insights from the evolution of morality. I then outline how these considerations lead to an expressivist account of epistemic normativity.

Last update:

Menu